### 2AC

**The role of the ballot is to determine between a topical plan and the status quo or a competitive policy option – the aff should get to simulate case impacts against the kritik**

#### Plan accesses the neg’s framework better—they have failed to answer our 1AC cards that prove a direct link between the role we play in debate as policy simulators with the tangible spillover effects that they create—even if US trade policy is not perfect—our position as students can transcend ideology and lead to effective solutions in the public sphere—the Ks scholarship only contributes to the same divide in the squo between ideologues who wholly reject the market and equally bad conservatives who are ideologically for trade, policy advocacy is key to bridge the gap – that’s Cho

#### Crist – act now

#### Torgerson – Corporate control monopoly now—means micropolitics fails

#### Wapner – tying action to political S extinction

#### Bergsten, Malloch-Brown are conceded and are massive Das to the alternative—trends and hard evidence proves that the decrease in protectionism and opening of markets allows 1. Billions to go to countries that the K claims are marginalized in the squo. And 2. Allows for effective south-south cooperation in the status quo that allows gives historically marginalized economic zones a powerful voice in determining the future direction of the international trading system—Means that the 1AC speech act is a valuable exercise in advocating a reversal of violent colonialism which is inevitable in a world in which countries that have a lot like the US can close themselves off and exploit economic disparity

#### Ignoring market engagement fails to prevent the states monopoly of violence—turns their alt

**Burchill** **7** [Scott Burchill, Lecturer at Deakins University in Australia, “Marxism” in An Introduction to International Relations: Australian Perspectives, Ed. Richard Devetak, Anthony Burke and Jim George, pp. 69-70]

The high level of order in mid-nineteenth-century Europe, however, appears to have deceived Marx into believing that the old world of statecraft and diplomacy was being superseded by the newly globalising forces of capitalism. In the 1840s the problem of war was not a preoccupation for social theorists; it was an ‘age of military quiescence’ (Gallie 1978: 69). Marx’s class analysis therefore almost **entirely neglected** the impact of diplomatic and strategic interaction upon both the process of state formation and the development of capitalism itself (Linklater 1986: 302). Marx not only **failed to anticipate** the increasingly autonomous character of the modern state, he also **ignored the crucial relationship** between the citizen’s concern for territorial security and the state’s claim to represent the ‘national interest’ in its conduct of foreign policy (Linklater 1990a: 153). ¶ According to Gallie (1978: 99), ‘**from its ﬁrst beginnings Marxist overall social theory was defective**, through its **failure to place and explain** the different possible roles of **war** in human history’. Insufﬁcient emphasis was given to the impact of war and state-formation upon the internationalisation of capitalism. Similarly, Marx did not foresee that the spread of capitalism would become a major reason for the reproduction of the modern states-system. Instead, he held to the view that ‘as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end’ (Marx and Engels 1967: 102). ¶ Marxism not only **underestimated the importance of the state’s monopoly control of** the instruments of **violence** and the autonomous nature of strategic and diplomatic life. It also ignored the crucial role that war played in establishing, shaping and reinforcing bounded political communities. This is because Marx believed that the transformation of the capitalist mode of production alone was the key to eradicating intersocietal estrangement (Linklater 1998: 116). Proletarian internationalism would liberate human loyalties and obligations from the conﬁnes of parochial nation-states which would ‘wither away’, to be replaced by a united community of free association. Marxism had little to say about how bounded communities interacted, why and how exclusionary boundaries were developed and maintained, or the **obstacles which prevented new forms of political community arising**. ¶ Marx’s account of international relations can be fairly described as an endogenous approach, where ‘the internal structure of states determines not only the form and use of military force but external behaviour generally’ (Waltz 1959: 125). As Waltz suggests, for Marx war is the external manifestation of the internal class struggle, which makes the problem of war coeval with the existence of capitalist states. If, as Marx suggests, it is capitalist states which cause wars, by abolishing capitalism states will be abolished and therefore international conﬂict itself will cease (Waltz 1959: 126–7). ¶ However as Michael Howard has suggested, ‘the fact remains that most of the serious political movements of our time, however radical, are concerned with remodelling nation-states, if necessary creating new ones, rather than with abolishing them’ (Howard 1983: 32–3). The experience of self-proclaimed revolutionary states such as the Soviet Union, and the Sino-Soviet split in the mid-1950s, would suggest that Marx had **signiﬁcantly underestimated** both the **systemic constraints on new forms of political community** and the **structural conditioning of the international system upon state behaviour**. As Linklater argues, ‘Soviet Marxism quickly succumbed to the classical method of power politics, postponing if not altogether abandoning its ideal of a world community in which nationalism and sovereignty would be superseded, and generating in its own bloc the very forms of nationalism and defence of state sovereignty which it intended to abolish’ (Linklater 1986: 304). In Waltz’s words, ‘the socialisation of non-conformist states’ by the diplomatic system has proved irresistible – even for self-proclaimed revolutionary regimes (Waltz 1979: 128). Neorealism’s claim that the anarchical condition of the international system homogenises foreign policy behaviour (see chapter 4) – an exogenous approach to international relations – is a major challenge to Marx’s belief that the internal conﬂictual properties of capitalist states will extend the boundaries of political community.

**The alt is ideological blindness that means criticism that fail to engage existing structures inevitably replicate their existence**

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Somewhere or other Latour makes the remark that we’ll never do better than a politician. Here it’s important to remember that for Latour– as for myself –every entity is a “politician”. Latour isn’t referring solely to those persons that we call “politicians”, but to all entities that exist. And if Latour claims that we’ll never do better than a politician, then this is because every entity must navigate a field of relations to other entities that play a role in **what is and is not possible** in that field. In the language of my ontology, this would be articulated as the thesis that the local manifestations of which an entity is capable are, in part, a function of the relations the entity entertains to other entities in a regime of attraction. The world about entities perpetually introduces **resistances and frictions** **that play a key role in what comes to be actualized.** ¶ It is this aphorism that occurred to me today after a disturbing discussion with a rather militant Marxist on Facebook. I had posted a very disturbing editorial on climate change by the world renowned climate scientist James Hansen. Not only did this person completely misread the editorial, denouncing Hansen for claiming that Canada is entirely responsible for climate change (clearly he had no familiarity with Hansen or his important work), but he derided Hansen for proposing market-based solutions to climate change on the grounds that “the market is the whole source of the problem!” It’s difficult to know how to respond in this situations.¶ read on! ¶ It is quite true that it is the system of global capitalism or the market that has created our climate problems (though, as Jared Diamond shows in Collapse, **other systems of production have also produced devastating climate problems).** In its insistence on profit and expansion in each economic quarter, markets as currently structured provide no brakes for environmental destructive actions. The system is itself pathological.¶ **However**, pointing this out and **deriding market based solutions doesn’t get us very far**. In fact, **such a response to proposed market-based solutions is downright dangerous and irresponsible**. The fact of the matter is that **1) we** currently **live in a market based world, 2) there is not**, in the foreseeable future **an alternative system on the horizon, and 3), above all, we need to do something now.** **We can’t afford to reject interventions simply because they don’t meet our ideal conceptions of how things should be.** **We have to work with the world that is here, not the one that we would like to be here**. And here it’s crucial to note that pointing this out does not entail that we shouldn’t work for producing that other world. It just means that we have to grapple with the world that is actually there before us.¶ It pains me to write this post because I remember, with great bitterness, the diatribes hardcore Obama supporters leveled against legitimate leftist criticisms on the grounds that these critics were completely unrealistic idealists who, in their demand for “purity”, were asking for “ponies and unicorns”. This rejoinder always seemed to ignore that words have power and that Obama, through his profound power of rhetoric, had, at least **the power to shift public debates and frames, opening a path to making new forms of policy and new priorities possible.** **The tragedy was that he didn’t use that power,** though he has gotten better.¶ I do not wish to denounce others and dismiss their claims on these sorts of grounds. As a Marxist anarchists, I do believe that we should fight for the creation of an alternative hominid ecology or social world. I think that the call to commit and fight, to put alternatives on the table, has been one of the most powerful contributions of thinkers like Zizek and Badiou. If we don’t commit and fight for alternatives those alternatives will never appear in the world. **Nonetheless, we still have to grapple with the world we find ourselves in**. And it is here, in my encounters with some Militant Marxists, that I sometimes find it difficult to avoid the conclusion that they are unintentionally **aiding and abetting the very things they claim to be fighting**. **In their refusal to become impure, to work with situations or assemblages as we find them, to sully their hands, they end up reproducing the very system they wish to topple and change. Narcissistically they get to sit there, smug in their superiority and purity, while everything continues as it did before because they’ve refused to become politicians or engage in the difficult concrete work of assembling** human and nonhuman **actors to render another world possible.** As a consequence, they occupy the position of Hegel’s beautiful soul that denounces the horrors of the world, celebrate the beauty of their soul, **while depending on those horrors of the world to sustain their own position**. ¶ To engage in politics is to engage in networks or ecologies of relations between humans and nonhumans. To engage in ecologies is to descend into networks of causal relations and feedback loops that you cannot completely master and that will modify your own commitments and actions. But there’s no other way, there’s no way around this, and we do need to act now.

#### We can make objective claims about warming---greenhouse gas emissions exist and influence global climate patterns---we must present environmental claims to mobilize support for change

Saarikoski 7 (Heli, Economics and Management @ Helsinki, "Objectivity and the Environment – epistemic value of biases" Environmental Politics 16 (3) p. Informa)

The suggestion that we could choose between knowledge claims on the basis of their truth value might sound objectionable to environmental constructivists who emphasise the thoroughly negotiated nature of knowledge. Szerszynski (1996: 117), for example, denies the existence of any extra-discursive reality to which we can resort in order to judge between different interpretations; **the world and our understanding of it are unavoidably constituted through language** and meaning. Therefore, he urges social scientists to abandon the 'the ghostly vestige of a “real”' in favour of a more antagonistic vision of cultural competition between competing discourses (Szerszynski, 1996: 117).¶ **Not all environmental constructivists are willing**, however, **to dispense with empirical evidence and scientific knowledge altogether.** Hannigan (1995: 34) distinguishes between 'strict constructionists', who reject all notions of reality external to discourse, and 'contextual constructionists', who maintain that claims can be evaluated on the basis of empirical evidence. Hannigan (1995: 188) explicates the latter position by using an example of global warming. The constructionist claim that the issue of global warming is socially constructed **does not imply that** **g**reen**h**ouse **g**a**s** emissions do not exist or that they might not influence global climate. Instead, the argument is that the actual changes in global climate are rendered meaningful only through social processes of assembling and **presenting environmental claims, visualising them, and mobilising support and acknowledgement for them.**¶ The 'contextual constructionists' position is compatible with a revised realist view of science put forward by Antony and Nelson. The world is indeed out there, imposing on us 'brute facts' such as increased levels of atmospheric CO2 emissions or losses of biodiversity. What is more, **it is possible to formulate theories which represent the outside world in the relevant respects**. However, though empirical evidence can help us to evaluate the effects and their magnitude, it cannot decide whether the effects are 'serious' and 'harmful' and constitute a 'problem'. As Bluhdorn (2000: 47) notes, the extent to which the undeniable changes in the physical environment can be described as environmental problems is always and necessarily a social construction. He writes (2000: 46): '[Constructionists] emphasise that processes of political agenda-setting

#### Advocating against environmentalism because nature is pure chaos is an essentialist act of epistemic violence that over-determines the linguistic construction of the environment to the point of ignoring its otherness---only the perm respects the absolute alterity and chaotic force of nature by minimizing the harm we do to it

Wapner 3--Professor of Global Environmental Politics in School of Int'l Service, American U (Paul, Leftist Criticism of 'Nature', http://dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=539)

The ethical dimension of this insight comes into view when we recognize the danger of forgetting the constructed quality of human experience. We construct our experience, fail to hold onto the idea that we've done just that, and then assume that our constructions are somehow "real." This becomes an ethical failing insofar as it silences the views of others. The claim to know how the world really is expresses a hegemonic ambition; it asserts authority in a way that delegitimizes others' perspectives on human experience and the world in general. **This is an ambition-a kind of "violence"-that many postmodernists find unacceptable.** ¶ The ethical alternative is respect for the "other." This involves turning down the volume of our own pronouncements about the world and listening to others-or providing them with the opportunity to express themselves so that we can listen. Hence the many efforts by postmodernists to "give voice to the other": from academic campaigns to expand the literary canon to popular efforts to embrace and celebrate multiculturalism. The aim is to promote the expression of the marginalized and disadvantaged. ¶ While postmodern cultural critics are comfortable giving voice to other people**, they stop short at the nonhuman world-the paradigmatic "other."** When it comes to nature, **postmodernists are happy to do all the talking**. They seem to see no need to heed the voice of the nonhuman, no reason even to assume that, in the vast world of rivers, chimpanzees, rainstorms, and whales, anything is being said. Postmodern cultural critics look at the nonhuman world and **think that they are looking in the mirror**. **There is nothing out there with its own authentic voice** because, as soon as we imagine it expressing itself, we recognize that we are speaking, and therefore making up, its words. As Christopher Manes puts it, "It is as if we had compressed the entire buzzing, howling, gurgling biosphere into the narrow vocabulary of epistemology, to the point that someone like Georg Lukacs could say, 'nature is a societal category'-and actually be understood."¶ THE THIRD response to eco-criticism would require critics to acknowledge the ways in which they themselves silence nature **and then to respect the sheer otherness of the nonhuman world**. Postmodernism prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery that characterizes modernity. **But isn't mastery exactly what postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world** with**in its** own **conceptual domain?** **Doesn't postmodern cultural criticism deepen the modernist urge toward mastery by** eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world? What else could it mean to assert that there is no such thing as nature?¶I have already suggested the postmodernist response: yes, recognizing the social construction of "nature" does deny the self-expression of the nonhuman world, but how would we know what such self-expression means? Indeed, nature doesn't speak; rather, some person always speaks on nature's behalf, and whatever that person says is, as we all know, a social construction. ¶ All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it**. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial.** We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). **But we need not doubt the simple idea that** a prerequisite of expression is existence. **This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must** be **support**ers, in some fashion, of **environmental preservation**.¶ Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean-François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." ¶ Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." **At the very least,** respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist**.** In our day and age, **this requires us to take responsibility for protecting** the actuality of **the nonhuman**. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment.¶ NOW, WHAT does this mean for politics and policy, and the future of the environmental movement? Society is constantly being asked to address questions of environmental quality for which there are no easy answers. As we wrestle with challenges of global climate change, ozone depletion, loss of biological diversity, and so forth, we need to consider the economic, political, cultural, and aesthetic values at stake. These considerations have traditionally marked the politics of environmental protection. A sensitivity to **eco-criticism requires that we** go further and **include an ethic of otherness in our deliberations**. That is, we need to be moved by our concern to make room for the "other" and hence fold a commitment to the nonhuman world into our policy discussions**.** I don't mean that this argument should drive all our actions or that respect for the "other" should always carry the day. But it must be a central part of our reflections and calculations. For example, as we estimate the number of people that a certain area can sustain, **consider what to do about climate** change, debate restrictionson ocean fishing, or otherwise assess the effects of a particular course of action, we must think about the lives of other creatures on the earth-and also the continued existence of the nonliving physical world. **We must do so** not because we wish to maintain what is "natural" **but because we wish to act in a morally respectable manner**.¶ I have been using postmodern cultural criticism against itself. Yes, the postmodernists are right: we can do what we want with the nonhuman world. There is nothing essential about the realm of rocks, trees, fish, and climate that calls for a certain type of action. But **postmodernists are also right that the only ethical way to act in a world that is socially constructed is to respect the voices of** the **others**-of those with whom we share the planet but with whom we may not share a common language or outlook. There is, in other words, a limit or guiding principle to our actions. As political theorist Leslie Thiele puts it, "One can't argue for the diversity of views of "nature" without taking a stand for the diversity of nature."

#### Nietzsche views compassion itself as the most difficult test – embrace it as a tool to overcome what is most difficult and then employ it in a new ethics

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This conventional interpretation of the close of Nietzsche's epic, however, is surely incorrect. A close examination of the passage in question reveals that Zarathustra never “overcomes” his compassion in the sense of ridding himself of it once and for all. There is no indication that our hero will fail to experience compassion upon further encounters with suffering, or even that he has ceased to feel compassion for the higher men. Achieving “mastery” over a virtue or sentiment, remember, necessarily implies retaining it in one's psyche, not abandoning it. Rather than ridding himself of all sympathetic sentiments once and for all, Zarathustra affirms his feelings for the higher men as having had their “time” as an essential component of his destiny. Compassion may cause him real misery, but, when properly harnessed, it helps rather than hinders Zarathustra's creativity. Indeed, as tightly bound as sympathetic feelings are with the possession of knowledge and the faculty of imagination, they are necessarily present in any creative psyche. Remembering, then, that the telos of human striving is not happiness but creation (more specifically value-creation), the experience of compassion is nothing to be regretted. While Rosen acknowledges that “the pitiful must be accepted as a natural part of human existence,” he nonetheless interprets Nietzsche to maintain that “it must also be destroyed in order for the creation of higher values that will themselves exclude or minimize pity by the imposition of a natural hardness that … is for Nietzsche the indispensable complement to the birth of a race of warrior-artists.”48 Yet value-creation does not require the “destruction” of compassion; it requires affirmation of the imaginative strength which allows the wise to share suffering with the objects of their all-encompassing knowledge. A mere brute warrior may not need to experience compassion, but a warrior-artist and value-creator surely must, albeit without allowing this suffering to interfere with his work. Though the weak may be unable to withstand even the slightest pain, the strong and creative not only withstand their suffering and their sympathetic suffering—they positively embrace them. Such suffering is of no “matter” to them, for it is no hindrance in their creative task, only a hindrance to the pursuit of happiness undertaken by the “last man” and other such degenerates (See Z I Prologue 5, p. 129). Compassion, Zarathustra concludes, is an unbearable burden only for those who mistakenly believe the true goal of human existence to be contentment rather than creation. Elsewhere, speaking of his philosophical honesty, Nietzsche reasons that, despite this honesty's regrettable aspects, “supposing that this is our virtue from which we cannot get away, we free spirits—well, let us work on it with all our malice and love and not weary of ‘perfecting’ ourselves in our virtue” (JGB VII:227, p. 345).49 Zarathustra treats compassion similarly, realizing that sympathetic suffering is inseparable from his imaginative creativity, and then returning to his destined task with the glow of a healthy soul ready to use all his faculties—including compassionate imagination—in pursuit of his chosen task.50 This, remember, is how value-creation first appears, as a great self-affirmation on the part of the naturally noble (see GM I:2, p. 462). Such a value-creator seizes the right to call even his propensities for suffering—including a propensity for the sympathetic suffering of Mitleid—by the name of virtue. The virtue so chosen will inevitably shine forth as a sign of his strength, and be put to service in the advancement of life.

#### The alternative displaces the rationalization and concern for humanity through its hostility towards politics --- this opens up the space for unimaginable totalitarian horrors

Lawrence J. Biskowski, Professor of political theory and political economy at the University of Georgia, Politics versus Aesthetics: Arendt's Critiques of Nietzsche and Heidegger, The Review of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Winter, 1995), pp. 59-89

Arendt consistently maintained that the entire philosophical tradition, from Plato through Heidegger and including Nietzsche, was "not of this world,"84 and thus **hostile** to and **dangerous** for politics. Whatever aspects of that tradition which may have ended with Nietzsche and Heidegger, the basically unworldly nature of its orientation to politics-as epitomized by the essentially **solitary philosopher searching for knowledge** about human affairs while withdrawing from them-survived. Arendt appreciated Nietzsche and Heidegger as thinkers and philosophers, and she certainly understood the relevance of key elements of their phi- losophies, such as the debunking of the tradition's metaphysical notions of Truth, for politics. But neither understood sufficiently the **distinctive elements of politics**. In view of these criticisms, it seems rather difficult to imagine Arendt as particularly sanguine about contemporary postmodern or aestheticized approaches to self and politics. She would al- most certainly launch a similar critique of the contemporary turn toward aestheticism. The pervasive and deadening effects of bureaucracy and instrumental forms of reason have produced a peculiar kind of overreaction. The latter-day aestheticians of poli- tics turn from one essentially unworldly principle to the next, and seek to make politics understandable via that principle. Jurgen Habermas makes a similar point: "To instrumental rea- son, they juxtapose in manichean fashion a principle only acces- sible through evocation, be it the will to power or sovereignty, Being or the dionysiac force of the poetical."85 From the point of view of Arendtian politics, aestheticization merely replaces or- more likely-temporarily **displaces rationalization**,86 while creating a host of **new dangers**, mainly stemming from the **loss of the common, public world** as a source of orientation. As Arendt pointed out in her study of totalitarianism, [t]he ruthless individualism of romanticism never meant anything more serious than that "everybody is free to create for himself his own ideology." What was new in **Mussolini's experiment** was the "attempt to carry it out with all possible energy."87 Previous forms of intellectual aestheticism aggravated the **disorientation** which is so much a feature of modernity, and inadvertently **contributed to an atmosphere in which otherwise unimaginable horrors became possible.**8

### Perm

#### We have to work within constraints of actual politics—Alt ignores debate as space for political interaction

Peter Hallward, Professor in the Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy at Middlesex University, London, 2006, Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation, p. 161-162

Now Deleuze understands perfectly well why ‘most of the objections raised against the great philosophers are empty’. Indignant readers say to them: ‘things are not like that […]. But, in fact, it is not a matter of knowing whether things are like that or not; it is a matter of knowing whether the question which presents things in such a light is good or not, rigorous or not’ (ES, 106). Rather than test its accuracy according to the criteria of representation, ‘the genius of a philosophy must first be measured by the new distribution which it imposes on beings and concepts’ (LS, 6). In reality then, Deleuze concludes, ‘only one kind of objection is worthwhile: the objection which shows that the question raised by a philosopher is not a good question’, that it ‘does not force the nature of things enough’ (ES, 107; cC WP, 82). Deleuze certainly forces the nature of things into conformity with his own question. Just as certainly however, his question inhibits any consequential engagement with the constraints of our actual world. For readers who remain concerned with these con­straints and their consequences, Deleuze’s question is not the best available question. Rather than try to refute Deleuze, this book has tried to show how his system works and to draw attention to what should now he the obvious (and perfectly explicit) limita­tions of this philosophy of unlimited affirmation. First of all, since it acknowledges only a unilateral relation between virtual and actual, there is no place in Deleuze’s philosophy for any notion of change, time or history that is mediated by actuality In the end, Deleuze offers few resources for thinking the consequences of what happens within the actually existing world as such. Unlike Darwin or Marx, for instance, the adamantly virtual orientation of Deleuze’s ‘constructivism’ does not allow him to account for cumulative transformation or novelty in terms of actual materials and tendencies. No doubt few contemporary philosophers have had as an acute a sense of the internal dynamic of capitalism — but equally, few have proposed so elusive a response as the virtual ‘war machine’ that roams through the pages of Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Like the nomads who invented it, this abstract machine operates at an ‘absolute speed, by being “synonymous with speed”’, as the incarnation of ‘a pure and immeasurable multiplicity; an irruption of the ephemeral and of the power of metamorphosis’ (TP, 336, 352). Like any creating, a war machine consists and ‘exists only in its own metamorphoses’ (T~ 360). By posing the question of politics in the starkly dualistic terms of war machine or state — by posing it, in the end, in the apocalyptic terms of a new people and a new earth or else no people and no earth — the political aspect of Deleuze’s philosophy amounts to little more than utopian distraction. Although no small number of enthusiasts continue to devote much energy and inge­nuity to the task, the truth is that Deleuze’s work is essentially indifferent to the politics of this world. A philosophy based on deterritorialisation, dissipation and flight can offer only the most immaterial and evanescent grip on the mechanisms of exploitation and domination that continue to condition so much of what happens in our world. Deleuze’s philosophical war remains ‘absolute’ and ‘abstract’, precisely, rather than directed or ‘waged’ [menee]. Once ‘a social field is defined less by its conflicts and con­tradictions than by the lines of flight running through it’, any distinctive space for political action can only be subsumed within the more general dynamics of creation or life. And since these dynamics are themselves anti-dialectical if not anti-relational, there can be little room in Deleuze’s philosophy for relations of conflict or solidarity, i.e. relations that are genuinely between rather than external to individuals, classes, or principles.

#### Perm is the best option—Their alternative seeks a plane of pure immanence away from the stratifications and territorializations endemic to Western thought, yet, the creation of such a space is a political task through-and-through. A politics of hospitality that gives space to alterity is the best way to open onto a future of immanence.

Jeffrey Atteberry, Lecturer in Comparative Literature at the University of California-Irvine, 2003, Critical Horizons, Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 219-20

The reformulation of power found in Deleuze and Derrida may provide a lens then for perceiving the political force and agency of living labour in terms that would not reduce living labour to a form of subjectivity that bears within itself all the structural traces of the labour power which serves capital in its capture. Living labour cannot constitute itself as a subject. Instead, it is continually submitted to a process of subjectivisation through its reduction to labour power. It is powerless to seize itself in any immediate or autonomous fashion. At the limit, there is not even an ‘itself’ properly understood there to be seized. In this sense, living labour is strictly speaking impossible. It would be but a figure of impossibility. This radical and constitutive powerlessness, however, would be the ultimate source of its excessive power. On account of this incapacity to seize itself, living labour eludes definitive capture by capital. As that force which overwhelms any effort at self-constitution, ‘living labour’ would be but a name for life’s irreducible difference from itself, the difference which endows life with all of its force. Life is the pure immanence of this differential force that is made possible by its very impossibility. Consequently, this force expresses itself in the form of an event or, as Deleuze would say, in the form of a haecceity. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari write, “There is a mode of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, thing, or substance. We reserve the name haecceity for it.”83 The individuation of a haecceity differs from that of a subject insofar as the former takes place as a singular event on the plane of immanence while the latter is the product of a command that structures the plane of transcendence. As a haecceity or event, the political agency of living labour does not operate on the level of the subject. Again, living labour will never appear as such, either to itself or to capital. Nevertheless, the trace of its force is continually recorded on the face of capital. The effects of living labour are unpredictable. Its actions cannot be programmed; it will always take capital by surprise, which gives its effects the appearance of contingency. This is its freedom. The political agency of living labour, therefore, cannot be actively willed. Nevertheless, there are actions that can be taken which would preserve the space of its emergence. In short, a political planomenon must be constructed that would respect its secrecy. In this sense, the construction of a plane of immanence remains as a political task. In more mundane terms, a community of hospitality remains to be formed that would safeguard the space of alterity. No demands, including those for ‘adequate consciousness’, should be made on living labour as condition for its action. Rather, the political community needs to find ways to respect, as if this were possible, the invisibility of living labour. In short, a civil society remains to be organised according to ethical principles that respect and acknowledge the limits of power, which is to say the powerlessness which is actually constitutive of any community.

#### Their belief that white supremacy inevitably dooms reforms dooms their alternative---their reliance on essentialized notions of white supremacy as the glue that holds the entire system of oppression together means their politics goes nowhere

Andersen 3 – Margaret L. Andersen, Professor of Sociology and Women's Studies and Vice Provost for Academic Affairs at the University of Delaware, 2003, “Whitewashing Race: A Critical Perspective on Whiteness,” in White Out: The Continuing Significance of Racism, ed Doane & Bonilla-Silva, p. 30-32

Even those who acknowledge the material basis of race and racism (and most do in passing) retreat to essentialized notions of whiteness as the thing that holds everything together—as though if white people were to abandon whiteness and change their minds, it would go away. Thus, for example, Giroux argues that "deconstructing whiteness" is the basis for a new democratic practice. He writes that rather than eradicating the concept of race, we should "renegotiate" whiteness, by which he means considering the differences in whiteness and the political possibilities that can be opened up through a "discourse of whiteness." This will "articulate new forms of identity, new possibilities for democratic practices, and new processes of cultural exchange" (1997:265). Whiteness, according to Giroux, promotes race-based hierarchies, and racial identity structures the struggle over cultural and political resources. He writes: "Whiteness' in this context becomes less a matter of creating a new form of identity politics than an attempt to particulate 'whiteness\* as part of a broader project of cultural, social, and political citizenship" (1997:295). Giroux explicitly advocates "a pedagogy of whiteness" as going beyond identifying whiteness as an ideology of privilege and domination, which he sees as making "white" monolithic and therefore not generating good antiracist politics. Instead he suggests that whites should "understand and struggle against the legacy of white racism while using the particularities of “their own culture as a resource for resistance, reflection, and empowerment'" (1997:310)—a quote he borrows from Stuart Hall, who in the original used it to refer to black Americans (Hall 1991). The role of people of color in whiteness studies then becomes not only nonexistent, but appropriated.¶ What about the implications of whiteness studies for classroom pedagogy? Should teachers use their time to teach about whiteness, or does this supplant other efforts for multicultural/multiracial education? Sheets argues that whiteness studies centers the dialogue on white identity rather than on multicultural/multiracial classroom practices and teacher-student relationships (Sheets 2000). Some even say that whiteness studies appropriates the pain of people of color and changes the goal of multicultural education into the transformation of white people, not the education of students of color or the education of whites about the experience of people of color. Seen in this way, people of color become invisible once again as whites become the center of attention. Such critics ask: Is not the goal of multicultural education learning about the experience of others? For whose purposes and to whose benefit docs whiteness studies work?¶ Finally, what kind of politics and social policies does whiteness studies suggest? The political/pragmatic implications of this literature are that we should create instability in racial categories. Is that enough? Two directions are suggested in the literature: abolishing whiteness and transforming/rearticulating whiteness. Thus, in the journal Race Traitor, Noel Ignatiev and John Garvey argue: "The key to solving the social problems of our age is to abolish the white race. Until that task is accomplished, every partial reform will prove elusive, because white influence permeates every issue of U.S. society, whether domestic or foreign" (1993-1994:10). They distinguish this from antiracism, claiming that "antiracism admits the natural existence of'races1" (1993-1994:10) and saying instead that "the way to abolish the white race is to disrupt that conformity. If enough people who look white violate the rules of whiteness, their existence cannot be ignored. If it becomes impossible for the upholders of white rule to speak in the name of all who look white, the white race will cease to exist" (1993-1994:36). There is debate about this position within the whiteness literature, but one cannot help but wonder: If "whiteness" disappeared, would we not still have racial subordination? Or if white people no longer thought of themselves as white, would not capitalism continue to produce a racially segregated and divided society?¶ Whiteness scholars see whiteness as subject to redefinition resistance and change. Hence Dyer writes: "A crucial political, cultural, and ultimately educational project is to make whiteness strange" (1997:4). Michael Apple notes that there are dangers, because this can have contradictory effects and can "run the risk of lapsing into progressive individualism" (Apple 1998:xi). He continues: "We must be on guard to ensure that a focus on whiteness doesn't become one more excuse to recenter dominant voices and to ignore the voices and testimony of those groups of people whose dreams, hopes, lives, and very bodies are shattered by current relations of exploitation and domination" (1998:xi).¶ Whether whiteness studies can provide the grounds for a racially progressive movement is highly questionable. As David Stowe (1996) asks: How many political movements have succeeded based on a renunciation of privilege? In the end, the whiteness literature seems to give whites a place in antiracist politics but does not well articulate a politics of change. If we disrupt the ideology of race and its effects on our interactions and relationships, do we necessarily destabilize white privilege in the material sense? Particularly since this body of literature seldom deals with the material reality of racial segregation and discrimination, this seems unlikely.

#### Ethical policymaking requires calculation of our impacts—refusing consequentialism allows atrocity in the name of ethical purity

Nikolas Gvosdev 5 (Nikolas, Exec Editor of The National Interest, The Value(s) of Realism, SAIS Review 25.1, Muse)

As the name implies, realists focus on promoting policies that are achievable and sustainable. In turn, the morality of a foreign policy action is judged by its results, not by the intentions of its framers. A foreign policymaker must weigh the consequences of any course of action and assess the resources at hand to carry out the proposed task. As Lippmann warned, Without the controlling principle that the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes, its commitments related to its resources and its resources adequate to its commitments, it is impossible to think at all about foreign affairs.8 Commenting on this maxim, Owen Harries, founding editor of The National Interest, noted, "This is a truth of which Americans—more apt to focus on ends rather than means when it comes to dealing with the rest of the world—need always to be reminded."9 In fact, Morgenthau noted that "there can be no political morality without prudence."10 This virtue of prudence—which Morgenthau identified as the cornerstone of realism—should not be confused with expediency. Rather, it takes as its starting point that it is more moral to fulfill one's commitments than to make "empty" promises, and to seek solutions that minimize harm and produce sustainable results. Morgenthau concluded: [End Page 18] Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible, between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.11 This is why, prior to the outbreak of fighting in the former Yugoslavia, U.S. and European realists urged that Bosnia be decentralized and partitioned into ethnically based cantons as a way to head off a destructive civil war. Realists felt this would be the best course of action, especially after the country's first free and fair elections had brought nationalist candidates to power at the expense of those calling for inter-ethnic cooperation. They had concluded—correctly, as it turned out—that the United States and Western Europe would be unwilling to invest the blood and treasure that would be required to craft a unitary Bosnian state and give it the wherewithal to function. Indeed, at a diplomatic conference in Lisbon in March 1992, the various factions in Bosnia had, reluctantly, endorsed the broad outlines of such a settlement. For the purveyors of moralpolitik, this was unacceptable. After all, for this plan to work, populations on the "wrong side" of the line would have to be transferred and resettled. Such a plan struck directly at the heart of the concept of multi-ethnicity—that different ethnic and religious groups could find a common political identity and work in common institutions. When the United States signaled it would not accept such a settlement, the fragile consensus collapsed. The United States, of course, cannot be held responsible for the war; this lies squarely on the shoulders of Bosnia's political leaders. Yet Washington fell victim to what Jonathan Clarke called "faux Wilsonianism," the belief that "high-flown words matter more than rational calculation" in formulating effective policy, which led U.S. policymakers to dispense with the equation of "balancing commitments and resources."12 Indeed, as he notes, the Clinton administration had criticized peace plans calling for decentralized partition in Bosnia "with lofty rhetoric without proposing a practical alternative." The subsequent war led to the deaths of tens of thousands and left more than a million people homeless. After three years of war, the Dayton Accords—hailed as a triumph of American diplomacy—created a complicated arrangement by which the federal union of two ethnic units, the Muslim-Croat Federation, was itself federated to a Bosnian Serb republic. Today, Bosnia requires thousands of foreign troops to patrol its internal borders and billions of dollars in foreign aid to keep its government and economy functioning. Was the aim of U.S. policymakers, academics and journalists—creating a multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia—not worth pursuing? No, not at all, and this is not what the argument suggests. But aspirations were not matched with capabilities. As a result of holding out for the "most moral" outcome and encouraging the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo to pursue maximalist aims rather than finding a workable compromise that could have avoided bloodshed and produced more stable conditions, the peoples of Bosnia suffered greatly. In the end, the final settlement was very close [End Page 19] to the one that realists had initially proposed—and the one that had also been roundly condemned on moral grounds.

#### Prior questions fail and paralyze politics

Owen 2 (David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.